JUDICIAL DIVERSITY
Sherrilyn A. Ifill†
LET ME BEGIN WITH TWO QUOTES.
The first: “I am . . . a Brooklynite, born and bred – a firstgeneration American on my father’s side, barely secondgeneration on my mother’s.”1
The second: “I am who I am in the first place because of my
parents . . . . My father was brought to this country as an
infant. . . . He grew up in poverty. Although he graduated
at the top of his high school class, he had no money for college . . . . [I]n the midst of the Depression, he found that
teaching jobs for Italian Americans were not easy to come
by, and had to find other work . . . .”2

The first quote is from Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s opening
statement at her Supreme Court confirmation hearing in 1993. The
second quote was part of the opening statement of Justice Samuel
Alito at his confirmation hearing in 2006.
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This has become an almost standard opening for modern Supreme Court nominees. Why is this? And why are these statements
about family and upbringing always focused on the hard-scrabble,
working class, or ethnic experience? We’re unlikely to hear a
nominee say, “I am an Upper East-sider, born and bred. I attended
the finest prep schools in New England, as my father did before me,
and his father did before him. Although my father didn’t need to
work due to our family’s investments in shipping and United Steel,
my father nevertheless took up the law.”
The effort by the nominee is always to communicate something
very specific to the American public at the outset of the hearing.
Even though I’m a highly educated judge, I’m like you at my core. I understand your experience and the experience of average people. In fact, nominees are telling the public to believe that, in addition to what the
nominees learned in law school, in the practice of law, or as judges
on the bench, they will take something more into the conference
room. They will take with them an understanding of how life is
lived for average people.
I begin with this because I do think that at some fundamental
level we all understand the importance of judicial diversity. Promoting the inclusion of racial and ethnic minorities, women, and
judges from a variety of backgrounds on our courts is a positive and
important value. This seems fairly non-controversial. So why aren’t
we more successful at diversifying our courts?
The most recent figures for the federal bench shows that of the
active federal judges on the courts (including bankruptcy and magistrate judges), 6.8% are African American, 5.3% are Hispanic, and
1.1% are Asian American. Only 26% of the active appellate judges
are women; and only 25% of district court judges are women.3
When we begin to look more closely at individual circuits the
figures get downright alarming. For example there is only one, and
has only ever been one, woman on the Eighth Circuit, Judge Diana
Murphy. The First Circuit also has only one woman – the Chief
3
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Judge, Sandra Lynch. The Second Circuit has enjoyed respectable
gender diversity, and has four active women judges.4 But only one
active Judge on the Second Circuit – based in New York – is African American. The Fifth Circuit has six active women judges (out of
17), but despite encompassing Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi, it
has only one active African American judge. You get the idea. It’s
rare to find a federal appellate court that has managed to achieve
both race and gender diversity.
Why is this? Are we less comfortable with the idea of promoting
racial and gender diversity than we like to think? And if so, why? I
think that the truth is that we prefer to treat judicial diversity as a
kind of noblesse oblige exercise. We don’t really want to talk very
much – at least not openly – about why judicial diversity matters,
except perhaps to mention the importance of having role models of
different backgrounds.
But we are not uncomfortable with judicial diversity across the
board. In fact, we’re quite comfortable with, and willing to embrace, some kinds of judicial diversity. Indeed some forms of judicial diversity have been fully internalized in our judicial selection
process.
I’ll give an example. In selecting judges to serve on the federal
courts of appeals there is an unwritten, but in almost all instances
strictly adhered to, tradition of appointing judges that more or less
reflect the geographic make-up of the circuit. The Eighth Circuit
encompasses seven states, so, it would be shocking for all of the 11
active judges on it to be from North Dakota. Geographic diversity
in the circuits is respected. Among the many contentious battles
we’ve had in trying to diversify the Fourth Circuit, where I live and
work, none was more rough and tumble than when then-President
George W. Bush sought to nominate a Virginian to fill the seat held
by the late, great and much-revered Marylander Frank Murnaghan.
Geographic diversity is understood as important for the circuit
court that covers multiple states.
4
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Why? Surely no one thinks that the judges on the Tenth Circuit
who are originally from Kansas will be biased in favor of Kansas
plaintiffs or defendants? No one seriously believes that an Iowa
judge will seek to advance the interests of Iowa in deciding cases
that come to the Eighth Circuit. So why bother with geographic
diversity? Because geographic diversity among judges on the Circuit
bench has value for the same reason that judicial diversity of any
kind has value.

T



here are two principal rationales that support the importance
of judicial diversity. The first is one about which I believe there
is largely a consensus. The other is perhaps a bit more controversial
(and goes to the heart of the some of the discussions had this summer during the Supreme Court confirmation process). I will address each of them briefly.
The first, and I think widely accepted, view is that diversity on
the bench promotes public confidence in the legitimacy of the
courts. It’s not that a judge from Iowa is biased in favor of Iowa litigants. It’s that if all the judges on the Circuit are from Iowa, then
Minnesota litigants or Arkansas litigants might lose confidence in
the fairness of the court.
The importance of public confidence to the legitimacy of our
courts cannot be overstated. Judges possess neither armies nor battalions. What courts rely on is the public’s acquiescence, the public’s sense that when a court issues a decision that decision is to be
obeyed. It is a key feature of a country in which the rule of law is
paramount. Decisions of our courts are to be complied with, even
when we disagree with them. The thankfully few occasions when
the public, and even elected officials, have departed from this –
such as in Little Rock, Arkansas over 50 years ago – have been
among the most shameful episodes in our country’s history.
But the public’s confidence in the judiciary must be earned. The
public wants to know ultimately not that its views will always win
the day, but that the deck is not stacked. That the judicial decisions
that govern our conduct, the reach of governmental power, our
constitutional rights and our statutory entitlements and prohibitions
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have been examined and subjected to the most fully informed and
vigorous scrutiny by our courts. Knowing this enables members of
the public to accept even those decisions with which they fundamentally disagree.
The second reason that judicial diversity is important is a bit
more controversial but I think it is important to discuss it openly.
That is the view that diversity on the courts enriches judicial decisionmaking, that the interplay of perspectives of judges from diverse backgrounds and experiences makes for better judicial decisionmaking, especially on our appellate courts. This view invites
some controversy; it inevitably leads to concerns about impartiality,
and whether judges are obeying their duty to decide cases based on
the facts and law of the case before them, not on their own predilections or views.
Again, let’s focus first on the non-controversial example of how
diversity can enrich judicial decisionmaking. One of the issues that I
wrote about in the midst of this past summer’s Supreme Court
nomination and confirmation process is the importance of professional-background diversity on the Supreme Court. The same can
be said for appellate courts. I’ve noted that the current track to the
Supreme Court has become pretty well set over the past 20 years.
One hundred percent of our current Supreme Court justices have
come from the federal courts of appeals. With the departure of Justice Souter, and before him Justice O’Connor, there are now no
justices on the Court who have state court judicial experience (or
even substantial state court litigation experience). And yet many of
the cases (criminal and civil) that wind their way up to the Supreme
Court emanate originally from state courts.
Likewise the law-practice experience of our current Supreme
Court justices has virtually excluded certain areas of practice, including criminal defense. This seems shocking to me, as our very
system of criminal justice could not exist without those who defend
the accused. I’m reminded of the observations of one former law
clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall. While many people who wrote
tributes to Justice Marshall after his retirement focused on his former career as a civil rights lawyer, she wrote:
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[Justice Marshall] knew how to read a record (and did so).
He knew how trials work, the importance of fact-finding,
how lawyers and judges can influence a jury without leaving
tracks in the record, the importance of procedural rules in
preserving justice. He knew about police procedures, the
interactions between law enforcement and criminal defendants, how government agencies work. [His] practical trial
experience generated a sophisticated understanding of issues and records, the kind of understanding that is essential
for effective appellate judging. Such expertise is sadly lacking on the current Court.5

Although there’s been very little interest in exploring the importance of professional-background diversity, the value of bringing
this kind of experience to the bench is fairly non-controversial.
But when we begin discussing other forms of diversity – gender
and race in particular – we start to get nervous about the idea that
the inclusion of women and/or judges of color might lead to different or even better judicial decisionmaking. I want to take a stab at
addressing this subject.
Let’s start with gender. It has been over two decades since the
first woman was nominated for a seat on the Supreme Court. But
there were discussions even 10 years before the appointment of
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor about appointing the first female Supreme Court justice.
I rarely hear commentators talk about the very sincere efforts of
President Nixon to appoint the first woman to the U.S. Supreme
Court. In 1971, Nixon was presented with the presidential windfall
of having two simultaneous nominations to the Court, when Justices Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan II announced their resignations within weeks of one another. Along with his confidantes and
advisors, H.R. Haldeman and Attorney General John Mitchell,
Nixon determined that one of those seats should go to a woman.
His search focused principally on Judge Mildred Lillie, a state appellate court judge from California, Nixon’s home state. Nixon believed that if he appointed a woman to the seat it would be historic,
5
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and that “it’ll always be a woman’s seat from then on.”6
I wish I could tell you that President Nixon sought to bring gender diversity to the Court because he believed that women justices
would make an important contribution to the work of the Court.
He didn’t. In fact, Nixon said “I don’t think a woman should be in
any government job whatever. I mean, I really don’t. The reason
why I do is mainly because they are erratic. And emotional. Men
are erratic and emotional too, but the point is a woman is more
likely to be.” He concluded about the Court, “there should never be
a woman there.”7
But to his credit Nixon also believed that “the woman’s viewpoint probably ought to be on the Court.” “It isn’t a man’s world
anymore,” he added, though he called this “unfortunate[].” And then
of course the politically-obsessed Nixon explained, “[s]o I lean to a
woman only because, frankly, I think at this time, John [Mitchell],
we got to pick up every half a percentage point we can.”8
In the end, President Nixon didn’t pick the first woman for the
Supreme Court. It became known that the American Bar Association would not give Judge Lillie a qualified rating for a seat on the
Court, and President Nixon chose instead to formally nominate
Lewis Powell and William Rehnquist. But it’s fascinating to look
back 38 years and see this very robust and open discussion between
President Nixon and his advisors about the wisdom of appointing a
woman to the Supreme Court.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was appointed to the Court by a
Democratic president in 1993. At her hearings she predicted that
“in [her] lifetime” she expected “to see three, four, perhaps even
more women on the High Court Bench, women not shaped from
the same mold, but of different complexions.”9 It’s sobering to note
6
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that it took 16 years to appoint only one woman of a different complexion to the Court, and it’s been a bit of a bumpy ride.
We’ve rarely talked openly and explicitly about the real concrete value of gender diversity on the bench – the potential that a
diverse set of legal decisionmakers can result in richer judicial decisionmaking. By this I do not mean to suggest that “wise Latinas” or
“wise white men” make better or worse decisions than one another.
What I do mean to suggest is that the interaction of wise Latinas,
white men and women, African Americans, Native American judges
– just like the interaction of former prosecutors, defense counsel,
corporate practitioners and in-house counsel – provides opportunities for a robust exchange that can inform appellate decisionmaking.
Let me pause here to emphasize an important point. Too often
our conception of what people mean when they talk about “better”
decisionmaking or the way race or gender might affect judicial decisionmaking is that we’re talking about affecting case “outcomes.”
The empirical data on this is sketchy and contradictory. It does appear that having even one woman on a three-judge appellate panel
affects the entire panel’s decisionmaking in employment discrimination cases.10 Beyond that the figures and the statistical disparities
between case outcomes when women or racial minorities are on a
panel are negligible, with slight bumps in discrimination cases and
some criminal cases.
But judicial decisionmaking is not just about outcomes; it is also
about the process of decisionmaking. About subjecting a given case to
the most rigorous and comprehensive analysis – analysis that takes
into account differing viewpoints and perspectives that may be
shaped by a judge’s personal or professional knowledge or experience. When this takes place in the appellate conference – when we
as the public are confident that the court has considered all of the
angles, applied the law to the facts and viewed the facts using the
full measure of their judicial experience and knowledge – then re10

See Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of
Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decisionmaking, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
299-330 (2004).
52

13 GREEN BAG 2D

Judicial Diversity
gardless of the outcome we can feel confident that the decisionmaking of that court is the best it could be. And we should want that.
We should want our cases to be rigorously examined in this way –
by judges from Colorado and Oklahoma and Nebraska, by male and
female judges, by white and Native American judges.
Judge C. Arlen Beam of the Eighth Circuit endorsed this kind of
exchange when he said in 1991 that: “The robust exchange of ideas at
conference and later, hones and strengthens our opinions and provides an
enjoyable part of our nonjudicial lives.”11
We saw this on display in the Supreme Court last Term in Safford Independent School District, the case about the young girl in Colorado who was strip-searched.12 It was Justice Ginsburg who shared
with her colleagues on the Court the kind of devastating humiliation
that a 13-year-old girl might suffer at being strip-searched in school,
a humiliation and injury that might rise to the level of a constitutional harm.13 Similarly, in the Lilly Ledbetter case,14 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent articulated a legitimate and important perspective
that contributed to our discourse about workplace discrimination.
We should remember that dissents also increase public confidence
because they allow opportunities for a court to speak from multiple
voices, so that even those dissatisfied with the court’s decision will
know that their perspective was taken into account, even if it failed
to carry the day.

11
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et me turn to addressing racial diversity on the bench. This
tends to be the form of diversity about which there is, understandably, often the most anxiety. For a variety of reasons, and
given our history, race is different. We afford racial classifications
the most searching scrutiny in constitutional law, and we tend to be
most sensitive to efforts to imbue race with significance beyond the
cosmetic.
But to recognize that differing racial or ethnic groups may have
different perspectives that bear on legal decisionmaking is not to
assign or essentialize the experiences of different groups. To be
sure, there is no one “black perspective” or “Latino perspective.”
But there are shared experiences that influence how we look at the
world around us – even the law. In previous articles about this I’ve
cited polls that showed that even black and white lawyers and judges
differ in their views about aspects of the criminal justice system. For
example, in one poll 83% of white judges polled, but only 18% of
black judges, believed that blacks are treated fairly in the criminal
justice system.15 This is a stark disparity. What is it that black
judges see that white judges do not? What is it that white judges see
that black judges do not? How do we reconcile these disparate
views of our justice system held even by judges? Is one view illegitimate and the other legitimate? The truth is that neither of these perspectives should be disqualified from legal decisionmaking.
It was Justice Byron White, in his tribute to Justice Thurgood
Marshall, who said about Marshall’s contribution to the conferences
on the Court that Marshall “would tell us things that we knew but
would rather forget; and he told us much that we did not know due
to the limitations of our experience.”16
All federal judges are lawyers – distinguished ones. But it is the
ways that they differ that makes a court. Judges fill in the spaces for
15
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each other. When appellate judges sit in the conference each brings
to bear the full weight of his or her knowledge and experience to
the record the panel must review. And each brings a different set of
experiences that influences how he or she reads the record, hears
the arguments presented, and responds to the claims made by the
parties. As Justice Cardozo once put it, “the eccentricities of judges
balance one another.”17
A judge brings to the table accumulated knowledge which he or
she applies to the record. That knowledge comes sometimes from
other cases the judge has read with similar records, or cases the
judge prosecuted that seem to bear on the case before the court, or
the judge’s remembrance of how water issues are managed in that
part of the country, his or her own experience as a legislator, or
experience litigating antitrust cases or giving instructions to a jury
as a trial judge. Judges cannot erase this knowledge from themselves. They can only acknowledge it and expose it to their colleagues so that it can be tested and examined openly – rejected if it
should not bear on the deliberations of the case before the panel,
utilized if it should.
This is what I’d hoped we were poised on the precipice of discussing this summer with the nomination of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, and with the scrutiny afforded to her now famous “wise
Latina” comment – which certainly warranted explanation. I hoped
we would explore what Justice Alito meant when he said at his confirmation hearings, “When I get a case about discrimination, I have
to think about people in my own family who suffered discrimination
because of their ethnic background or because of religion or because
of gender, and I do take that into account.”18 No one on that Judiciary Committee three years ago thought that Judge Alito meant that
he feels more inclined to rule in favor of a plaintiff in a discrimination case because of what his forebears suffered as Italian-American
immigrants. Judge Alito instead suggested that he has a heightened
17
18
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awareness of the possibilities of, and harms of, discrimination. That
he may even have a sense of how discrimination can manifest itself
in the lives or average, hard-working people from disfavored racial
or ethnic groups. By contrast, although she experienced gender discrimination as a young law graduate, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor
confessed that growing up on a ranch in Arizona she “had not been
personally exposed to racial tensions . . . . [She had] no personal
sense, [growing up] of being a minority in a society that cared primarily for the majority.”19
I firmly believe that we will not make significant strides in promoting diversity on the bench until we confront openly the potential of diversity to enrich judicial decisionmaking. It is in the interest
of all of us, white, black, Latino, Asian American, Native American, to have the best, most deeply informed judicial decisionmaking.
Empirical studies that try to determine how or whether the race
or gender of judges affects the outcomes of different kinds of cases
are interesting of course, but it comes as no surprise that these studies are not particularly illuminating. One reason – which I suggested earlier – is that case outcomes are not, to my mind, the appropriate measure of how diversity affects judicial decisionmaking.
It is the process even more than the outcome that may be most important to measure. I know of only one study that attempted to
measure this, and the study authors found a rather significant difference in one set of cases.20
But I also think that empirical studies will not really be useful
until we’ve vigorously talked about this issue, so that judges white
and black, male and female will become more reflective and con19
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scious of, and more willing to examine and share, how their experiences, perspectives and viewpoints shape their approaches to law.
So long as we continue the myth that only minority and women
judges have particular perspectives that have the potential to influence how they view some legal issues, and that white, male judges
are impartial umpires, we cannot really measure how diversity affects the process of decisionmaking. All judges must be willing to
admit that they are the product of all of their experiences – if the
judge saw combat in World War II or in Vietnam; was a solo practitioner in a rural county; was a family lawyer; or grew up on or near
a reservation.
Let me share with you what the Supreme Court said in a case
called Peters v. Kiff, when the Court struck down the conviction of a
white criminal defendant because African Americans had been excluded from the jury venire. The Court said that removing any
identifiable segment of the community from jury service “removes
from the jury room the qualities of human nature and varieties of
human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable.”21
Judges are not juries, it’s true. But judges are legal decisionmakers, and like jurors judges are also the product of a variety of human
experiences which may bear on their understanding of the law’s
power, reach, or restrictions.
I thought of the Supreme Court’s words in Peters v. Kiff when I
read THE LAZY B, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s memoir about
her life as a young girl growing up on her father’s ranch in Arizona
in the 40s and 50s.22 It’s hard to imagine that the lessons and routine of life on the ranch – the sense of community, the hard work,
the “no-excuses” approach to tasks that had to be done, and most of
all the strong and enduring respect for and relationship to the environment – didn’t shape Justice O’Connor in ways that influenced
her mindset as a lawyer and judge.
They also come to mind when I think about the life of the late
21
22
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Theodore McMillian, the first African American member of the
Eighth Circuit. Jeffrey Morris’ history of the Eighth Circuit describes McMillian’s background:
[He was] the son of a factory worker and the greatgrandson of slaves. The eldest of 10 children, McMillian attended a segregated St. Louis school . . . and Lincoln University, the only four-year institution of higher education in
Missouri then open to African Americans. After McMillian
graduated from Lincoln, Phi Beta Kappa with majors in
mathematics and physics, he could find employment only as
a dining-car waiter. After serving in the military during
World War II, McMillian was unable to get into medical
school because of his race. Instead he attended St. Louis
University Law School, where he graduated at the top of
his class. McMillian set up his practice, but needed to supplement his income by work as a busboy, movie projector
operator, janitor, and adult-education teacher.23

Perhaps it is “unknown and unknowable” how these experiences
influenced Judge McMillian’s understanding of the law’s reach and
application to the lives of the litigants whose cases he decided. As a
judge, he enjoyed an unchallenged reputation for fairness, integrity
and professionalism. But it seems to me that it would be a deep loss
to deny the significance of his rich experiences in shaping his legal
philosophy and thinking, just as it would be foolish to disqualify the
influence of life on the Lazy B on the thinking of Justice O’Connor.
I challenge judges, and even lawyers to think back on the experiences that have shaped our understanding of the law’s reach and
power, our sense of justice and injustice, our commitment to the
rule of law. These experiences are part of us. And they are part of
what we contribute to the legal system.
Thus, I continue to hope that we will have productive conversations about diversity on the bench in the future.
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